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The Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) was once the capital of a 
vast empire of terror; a place where surveillance, persecution, and 
extermination became merely a quotidian, bureaucratic function 
and where the Schreibtischtäter could implement their deadly 
ideology from afar, or sometimes in person; a place where 
divisions of the SS less associated by the general public with Nazi 
crimes against humanity, such as the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) and 
Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo), would persecute and kill more people 
than the Gestapo and most other Nazi institutions of terror. The 
RSHA and its many offices became an outlet for many Nazi 
intellectual elites, who were educated at the prestigious institutions 
of Weimar and Nazi Germany. After the creation of the RSHA 
within the SS, these individuals through this apparatus and the 
opportunities presented by German military conquests were 
transformed from ideological academics to calculating 
exterminators of millions. Some made the transition behind a desk 
in Berlin, while others were committed to seeing the fruits of their 
labor first hand. These were the ‘true believers’ and most devoted 
followers of National Socialism. 
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Introduction 
In the center of modern-day Berlin, long buried under portions of the Berlin Wall on 
Prinz Albrecht Straße, rests the foundation blocks of a once massive and imposing building, 
which once housed the office of the Reichsicherheitshauptampt (Reich Main Security Office). 
Today, the foundations are fully excavated and are on permanent display as part of the exhibition 
Die Topographie des Terrors. The exhibit centers on the roles the departments and key 
individuals of the RSHA played in perpetrating the Holocaust. Nazi institutions such as the 
RSHA, the SD, and SiPo, and even the Einsatzgruppen are not often associated with the crimes 
of the Third Reich by the general public, while the SS, SA and Gestapo are generally well 
known.1 Even in academia, the RSHA often escapes notice, not being presented as the nexus of 
Nazi terror and perpetration. Individuals like Adolf Eichmann, Reinhard Heydrich, Heinrich 
Himmler, Adolf Hitler, and Joseph Goebbels and the SS as an institution take center stage in the 
historiography of Nazi perpetrators, but Nazi crimes are bigger than the few, big leaders of the 
National Socialist regime and more complex than a single umbrella organization.  
In his analysis of the SS Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf (The Order under the Death’s-
head), historian Heinz Höhne mentions the RSHA frequently, but always pushes it to the 
background and does not appreciate its central role, referring to it as a ‘shadow organization’ 
performing menial, bureaucratic tasks.2 To quickly achieve a concerted effort as immense as the 
Holocaust on the state and party level required an immense bureaucracy to manage the logistics 
of extermination on an industrial scale. By 1944, some three-thousand individuals were 
employed by the RSHA and every member, whether merely alphabetizing unsorted files, 
                                                          
     1 For the definitions of German terms and Nazi institutions, see Appendix 1B on page 37. 
     2 Heinz Höhne, Der Orden Unter dem Totenkopf: Die Geschichte der SS (Gütersloh, Germany: Siebert Mohn 
Verlag. 1967), 237. 
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compiling reports from SD informants, or even calculating the logistics of transporting hundreds 
of thousands of people in a few days, contributed on some level to the Holocaust.3 
A comparison one may make to conceptualize the RSHA is with the bureaucracy 
depicted in the dystopian film Brazil, in which the task of every technocrat within the massive 
bureaucratic workforce was so specific and convoluted that no one person could comprehend 
how his or her role contributed to the master plan. However, such a depiction could only be 
partly true if applied to perhaps the lowest rungs of the bureaucratic ladder, but certainly not to 
those on the middle or upper levels. The men of the RSHA knew to what common purpose they 
were working and devoted their careers to its completion.4 They were not ardent, anti-Semitic 
thugs as found in the SA, but the intellectual elite of German academia. All were university 
graduates and many had doctorates in history, political science, law, or medicine. Born primarily 
between 1900 and 1910, they were too young to have fought in the first World War, but became 
supporters of völkisch groups in their hometowns and universities in the 1920s and saw the 
Machtergreifung of 1933 as an opportunity to put into practice not only what they believed, but 
what they ‘knew’ as fact.5  
Joining the SD throughout the 1930s, they perfected their rationale for supporting the 
racial state and justified the need for racial purity, but the RSHA converted theory into practice. 
The leadership of the RSHA was largely comprised of men of the same generation, experiences 
and education, which reared them to form the intellectual backbone of the Nazi regime.6 
However, only through the creation of the RSHA and its ability to focus their efforts did these 
                                                          
     3 Michael Wildt, “The Spirit of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA),” Totalitarian Movements & Political 
Religions 6, no. 3 (December, 2005): 338. 
     4 Christian Ingrao,  Believe and Destroy: Intellectuals in the SS War Machine, trans. Andrew Brown (Cambridge, 
UK : Polity Press, 2013), 85. 
     5 Michael WIldt, An Uncompromising Generation : The Nazi Leadership of the Reich Security Main Office, trans. 
Tom Lampert (Maidson, WI. : University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 85-6. 
     6 Ingrao, Believe and Destroy, ix.  
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men transform from mere racial theorists, academics, spies, and lawyers to the architects of 
extermination and mass murder; the true believers and practitioners of Nazi ideology. 
Historiography 
Historians of the SS 
Secondary sources focusing on the RSHA or individual leaders other than the big four 
(Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels, and Göring) have been non-existent until the last decade. On the 
other hand, the historiography on the SS as a whole is very rich and has been so since the 
immediate post-war years. One of the forerunners in SS historiography was British historian 
Gerhard Reitlinger, who published his book The SS: Alibi of a Nation in 1957. Writing a mere 
decade after the end of the war, while prosecution of Nazi criminals was largely slowing down in 
West Germany, Reitlinger presented an argument that reflected his historical environment. As 
part of his title Alibi of a Nation suggests, Reitlinger claimed that the SS became a convenient 
excuse for the German nation; only a small group of Nazi zealots were held responsible for war 
crimes and the German nation as a whole presented itself as passive followers and ignorant of 
Nazi crimes.7 Reitlinger charged both contemporary and future German historians to deconstruct 
this myth and not to allow the new German nation to avoid coming to terms with its recent 
history.  
Despite his crusade against historical silence, Alibi of a Nation does suffer from some 
classic shortcomings: the entire narrative is told top down, focusing on the top leaders of the 
Nazi hierarchy and rarely including an analysis of lower level members of the SS let alone 
individual case studies; those who were committed Nazis are presented as members of the 
middle class who chose the lesser of two evils (Nazism vs. Communism); and each department 
of the SS is presented in a vacuum. Reitlinger stated that “the SD was fiercely independent even 
                                                          
     7 Gerald Reitlinger, The SS, Alibi of a Nation, 1922-1945 (New York: Viking Press, 1957), 451. 
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after being subsumed into the RSHA,”8 which undermines the significance of the RSHA and its 
ability to coordinate the various departments of the SS.  
A decade later, German historian Heinz Höhne published his work Der Orden unter dem 
Totenkopf, which, similar to Reitlinger, was a comprehensive history of the SS and its role in 
Nazi crimes before and during the Second World War. Höhne devoted multiple chapters to an 
analysis of the SD and SiPo and a number of key individuals, along with an entire chapter on the 
RSHA, but these focused much more on their structural development and presented many 
integral figures, with the exception of Eichmann, Heydrich, and Himmler, as passive 
bureaucrats. At the heart of Höhne’s argument is an indictment of the petite bourgeois and upper 
middle-classes, which, in his view, constituted the majority of SS membership. However, in both 
his origins chapters of the SS and conclusion, Höhne presented a generational analysis of SS 
men, something missing entirely from Reitlinger’s book. Höhne argued that men of a similar, 
authoritative generational outlook contributed to creating an environment, in which the rule of 
law was subverted to the rule of will.9  
Höhne was part of a new generation of historians who sought to distance themselves from 
the previous ‘fascist generation.’ Most of Höhne’s arguments on what led to the Nazi 
perpetration of crimes are structurally based, citing increasing radicalization through the SD, 
SiPo and Gestapo as their authority and responsibilities increased in size and scope. Yet he 
largely underestimated the significance of the RSHA, rendering it as mere tool of communication 
between Heydrich and the various offices of the SD and SiPo, even claiming that its only 
                                                          
     8 Ibid., 40. 
    9 Höhne, Der Orden, 128. 
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physical existence was its printed acronym on every sheet of internal memorandums and 
correspondence.10  
However, both Höhne and Reitlinger were at a disadvantage when they wrote their 
respective works. The office building, which housed the RSHA in the center of Berlin was 
completely destroyed by the end of the war and was paved over with the building of the Berlin 
Wall in August of 1961. Its foundations would not be re-discovered until after reunification. 
Hence, neither author had a precise physical location to associate with the RSHA. Cold war 
divisions also hampered research, as a large portion of RSHA documents were sealed in archives 
in East Berlin or Moscow, which forced both Reitlinger and Höhne to rely primarily on 
testimonies from the defendants at Nuremburg, such as Otto Ohlendorf and Franz Six. There 
were only a few individuals on trial who were former personnel of the RSHA and they 
intentionally downplayed the importance and role of their office in perpetrating the Holocaust.11 
Although Höhne was writing when social history was first coming into existence in academia, he 
and Reitlinger cannot be expected to have engaged in an approach that had not yet come to 
fruition. It would be a later generation of historians and researchers who would write the first 
comprehensive works on the RSHA and the generation of men who ran it.  
Post-1990 Historians 
Post-Cold War historians would not only have the benefit of access to more sources than 
previous researchers, but also the advantage of technology. In September of 1999, an article 
                                                          
    10 Ibid., 237. 
    11 The ploy did not work out in Ohlendorf’s favor, as he was executed in 1951 for his role in the Holocaust. When 
Ohlendorf was tried at Nuremburg and he, like most of the defendants, argued that “it is inconceivable that a 
subordinate leader should not carry out orders given by leaders of the state.”  In its judgement, the tribunal 
decided that they had tried “but two Ohlendorfs: the student, lecturer, and scholarly analyst, and the head of an 
Einsatzgruppe responsible for the extermination of 90,000 people.” “Allied Tribunal at Nuremberg.” Nuremberg 
Trial Proceedings Volume 4: (Twenty-Sixth Day Thursday 3 January, 1946: Morning Session. 2008), 353; Ingrao, 
Believe and Destroy, 200. 
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published in the journal History and Computing titled “Analysing the Sociography of the 
Membership of the Schutzstaffel in SS-Oberabschnitt Rhein” by Anne Becker and Detlef 
Mühlberger presented evidence that further refuted the long-standing belief among historians 
that the SS was purely a middle-class institution. According to a number of computer-based, 
statistical models and using SS registration records from the Rheinland, Becker and Detlef 
confirmed that around fifty percent of SS members before 1933 and forty-three percent after the 
Nazi seizure of power came from working and lower-class backgrounds.12 Yet these percentages 
were not homogenously distributed. In terms of the SS leadership, it was almost entirely 
comprised of individuals of middle and upper-class backgrounds, while SS-Death’s Head squads 
in concentration camps were overwhelmingly working-class.13 The RSHA men all came from 
middle-class backgrounds, but it is important to reaffirm their socio-economic standing with this 
new evidence in order to demonstrate how these seldom researched or mentioned individuals 
were important and privileged leaders among the SS as well. At any rate, the SS, and the Nazi 
Party as a whole, was represented by all socio-economic strata and such new findings would 
greatly inform scholarship on the SS in the new millennium.  
In 2003, Michael Wildt published his book An Uncompromising Generation: The Nazi 
Leadership of the RSHA, which was one of the first (if not the first) analytical looks at RSHA 
personnel from a combined generational and structural perspective. Wildt argued that the four-
hundred men (and one woman) in leadership positions at the RSHA, unlike the rest of the SS, 
were homogenous in background in terms of socio-economic status, education, and early 
participation with the Nazi party and other völkisch groups, and that they were not passive 
                                                          
     12 Anne Becker and Detlef Mühlberger, “Analysing the Sociography of the Membership of the Schutzstaffel in SS-
Oberabschnitt Rhein,” History & Computing 11, no. 3 (October, 1999): 220-1.  
     13 Ibid.  
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Mitläufer, but the intellectual backbone of the Nazi party.14 However, prior to the creation of the 
RSHA in 1939, the efforts of these men were mostly in race, state, and racial-state theory. Only 
through the creation of the RSHA were their efforts focused and theories put to practice, often 
firsthand as leaders of Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos in eastern Europe. Wildt based his 
findings on twenty-nine individuals, most of whom had doctorates, published books and 
scholarly journals throughout the NS-era, taught at universities, and were members of the SS.  
More recently in 2013, Christian Ingrao published the English version of his book Believe 
and Destroy: Intellectuals in the SS War Machine, originally published in 2010 in France, which 
took Wildt’s method of a generational outlook and applied it to a much larger group sample of 
eighty-four individuals. Although not researching too deeply into the structure of the RSHA, 
Ingrao created a much clearer narrative of the experiences of this generation that separates them 
from the older generation of Nazis, which included Hitler and others who had fought in the First 
World War. While Wildt presented these individuals as more or less born psychopaths, Ingrao 
convincingly incorporated the impact of the trauma of war and defeat, even though they had not 
experienced combat, into the narrative of this generation as a historical and psychological 
starting point for their path towards Nazi ideology.15 Overall, Ingrao depicted this generation as 
being in the best position to provide intellectual and ideological justification for genocide during 
the Second World War.16 They were true believers of Nazi ideology at the start of their careers, 
did not require conversion, and provided a façade of academic integrity to Nazi policy and 
authority, which made them a perfect fit for membership of the SS intellectual elite.  
 
 
                                                          
     14 Michael WIldt, An Uncompromising Generation, 9-10.  
     15 Christian Ingrao,  Believe and Destroy: Intellectuals in the SS War Machine, 16. 
     16 Ibid., 207-8.  
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Historical Background 
The history of the generation of the RSHA is inextricably intertwined with the history 
and development of the SS. Heinz Höhne described its earliest beginnings as such: “the history 
of the SS begins where the chronicle of the National-Socialist movement is introduced; in the 
tumult of post-1918 Germany.”17 The Freikorps, especially the units that violently ousted the 
workers commune in Munich in 1919, became a quasi-feeder program for the future SS. In 
Munich elite groups known as Stosstrupp (strike force) or Stabswache (headquarters’ guard) 
formed from former Freikorps fighters as essential bodyguard units for Adolf Hitler and his 
entourage when they were in public.18 The first Stabswache formed in March, 1923 when a few 
“old fighters swore on their lives to protect Hitler from both external and internal enemies.”19  
In the weeks leading up to the Putsch of November 9, 1923, Hitler personally created a 
new bodyguard group called Stosstrupp Hitler out of the former Stabswache and placed two men 
in command, Joseph Berchtold and Julius Schreck.20 It would be Schreck who was tasked with 
forming Stosstruppen, which were renamed Schutzstaffel (protection squad) on April 4, 1925, in 
every German city that could be organized upon Hitler’s arrival and each group typically 
consisted of only ten men and one designated captain dressed in black to distinguish themselves 
from the larger SA units.21 Due to their small number, SS units were seldom noticed and dwarfed 
by the much larger, louder, and more violent SA. The purpose of the SS would begin to change 
drastically with the appointment of Heinrich Himmler as Reichsführer-SS on January 6, 1929.22 
Himmler’s view on the future of the SS, as Reitlinger described, was that “all revolutions reach a 
                                                          
     17 All translations are my own unless stated otherwise. Höhne, Der Orden, 19. 
     18 Reitlinger, The SS, 5-7.  
     19 Höhne, Der Orden, 23.  
     20 Ibid., 25.  
     21 Ibid., 28.  
     22 Reitlinger, The SS, 14. 
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stage when mob enthusiasm becomes too unwieldy and an inner bodyguard is called in to the 
protection of the new state at the cost of some heads.”23 Himmler began to consolidate his 
position in Munich, Bavaria, and Germany as a whole through absorbing control of the local 
police and undermining his main rival, Ernst Röhm and the SA.24  
By 1931, the ranks of the Nazi party were beginning to swell, but the threat of infiltration 
grew as well, which would give Himmler the opportunity to weed out his rivals. The SS was by 
no means the first to have a security service, as both the SA and the political Gauleiter had some 
sort of information and surveillance squad.25 Founded in 1931, The SD or security service was to 
be Himmler’s way around a number of hurdles to the consolidation of his power. Himmler 
placed a former Navy officer named Reinhard Heydrich, who had only marginal intelligence 
experience, at its head,26 but nevertheless was quick to adapt it to Himmler’s purposes. 
Heydrich’s small SD had to out-compete the other Nazi intelligence services in spying on 
enemies of the party (Zionists, Communists, etc.), while simultaneously spying on them as well.  
By summer of 1932, the SD managed to outpace much of its competitors and Heydrich, 
along with his deputy Werner Best, began recruiting young university graduates to ensure its 
prominent position as the intelligence service of the Party. As a result of the Röhm purge in June 
1934, the SS not only brought down its major rival, the SA, but also fully subsumed and 
incorporated Göring’s Gestapo, giving the SS a full monopoly on German police and intelligence 
services.27 The rapid growth of the SD and the massive influx of security and police forces 
necessitated the creation of the SS security police (Sipo) on June, 26 1936, which would also fall 
                                                          
     23 Ibid., 1.  
     24 Höhne, Der Orden, 31-2. 
     25 George C Browder, Foundations of the Nazi Police State: The Formation of SiPo and SD (Lexington, KY: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 22. 
     26 WIldt, An Uncompromising Generation, 140.  
     27 Klaus Fischer, Nazi Germany: A New History (New York: Continuum International Publishing, 2006), 335. 
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under Heydrich’s control, but friction would immediately begin to arise between the SD and 
Sipo.28 As both organizations were defined very loosely, there was a lot of overlap in tasks, and 
often diverging interests between the two.  
As international tension escalated by 1938 and war seemed imminent, Himmler and 
Heydrich needed to increase cooperation and increase efficiency in both domestic and foreign 
espionage and surveillance and to focus energy on weeding out not just political enemies, but 
any racial or social ‘undesirable,’ for the creation of a racially pure state. Heydrich tasked 
Werner Best and leader of the SD-Auslandamt (foreign office) Walter Schellenberg with drafting 
plans for “the amalgamation of the police and intelligence services.”29 Best’s plan called for total 
amalgamation, while Schellenberg proposed keeping the offices separate, but in close 
cooperation and within the same organization. Heydrich accepted Schellenberg’s plan and titled 
the new creation the Reichssicherheitshauptamt or Reich Main Security Office, which was 
officially created on September 27, 1939, nearly four weeks after the invasion of Poland.30 
It was no coincidence that the RSHA was created at the start of Hitler’s war against 
Europe. Nazi Germany had commenced an arms buildup in the years leading up to September 1, 
1939, and the creation of the RSHA was another necessary step in this process. The RSHA 
consolidation created seven offices to manage the tasks of the Nazi state: organization of SS 
personnel in SD and various police divisions (Office I), legal and administrative counsel (Office 
II), analysis of the state of German domestic life (SD-domestic, Office III), enemy intelligence 
(Gestapo-Office IV), crime fighting (Kripo-Office V), analysis of the state of foreign nations 
(SD-Foreign, Office VI), and ideological research and collection of enemy ‘propaganda’ 
                                                          
     28 Reitlinger, The SS, 40.  
     29 WIldt, An Uncompromising Generation, 156.  
     30 Höhne, Der Orden, 237. 
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(Library-Office VII).31 These seven offices and their broadly assigned tasks within the 
superstructure of the SS gave the RSHA unlimited authority both in Germany and the occupied 
territories. In Germany, agents, spies, and other individual contacts were the eyes and ears of the 
RSHA, but in the occupied territories, starting with Poland, the Wehrmacht and various SS 
organizations, such as the Waffen SS and the Einsatzgrupppen, collected intelligence to be 
reported back.32 Every occupied territory had a few local offices of the SD or RSHA to facilitate 
contact between Berlin and the front at all times.  
The infamous Einsatzgruppen were also inventions of the RSHA. Handpicked from their 
own staff and various police forces, these groups were in constant and direct contact with RSHA 
headquarters in Berlin.33 During the war, the RSHA could be seen as the Nazi brain trust, 
formulating the plans of mass deportation, enslavement, terror, and murder to create a new racial, 
European order. As the war turned against Germany and Berlin was subjected to constant 
bombing, the RSHA ceased as a consolidated entity and operated out of a number of facilities 
until war’s end.34 The Einsatzgruppen and SS-Death’s Head units provided the grunt work and 
gained infamy for their crimes, while many of those who orchestrated their operations remain 
less known; only a few faced judgment at Nuremberg and most received brief prison sentences 
and were released after only a few years. Some even offered their espionage services to the 
Western allies for the coming Cold War and were never tried.35  They remained secretly 
committed to the ideology of National Socialism after the denazification trials until their deaths 
                                                          
     31 Wildt, An Uncompromising Generation, 14-17. 
     32 RSHA Amt II, “Die stellung der West-Ukraine und West-Weissrusslands in den UdSSR,“ Internal Report of the 
RSHA Amt II Gegnerforschung (Microfilm), Reel 4, File 17 (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum: 1940). 
     33 “Tagesbericht der Einsatzgruppen.” Internal Report of the SiPo (Microfilm), Reel 2, File 1, Frames 1-4  (United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archive. 1939). 
     34 Wildt, An Uncompromising Generation, 349-51.  
     35 Richard Breitman, “Historical Analysis of 20 Name Files from CIA Records,” (National Archives: April, 2001), 
accessed April 6, 2016. 
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decades after the war. It was an ideology they helped to craft. The RSHA and its Einsatzgruppen 
organizations provided opportunities for these architects to see their work in action and to take 
part in activities that they considered not only historic, but a scientific necessity. This was the 
work they had prepared for academically since they were students and psychologically since 
their youth.  
An Aspiring Generation 
 Of the three-thousand employees of the RSHA, four-hundred were leaders of varying 
importance, but were nonetheless a rather homogenous group and shared relatively the same 
level of culpability. As case studies representing various levels of leadership within the RSHA, 
eight individuals will be the focus of this analysis: Reinhard Heydrich, Werner Best, Dr. Franz 
Six, Otto Ohlendorf, Walter Schellenberg, Dr. Helmut Knochen, Erich Ehrlinger, and Emil 
Augsburg. Heydrich, Best, Six, Ohlendorf, and Schellenberg represent the leadership of the 
RSHA while Knochen, Ehrlinger, and Augsburg characterize those in more functional roles and 
lower in the hierarchy. The eldest of this group, Best, was born in 1903 with Schellenberg, 
Ehrlinger, and Knochen being the youngest, all born in 1910, which puts this group between the 
ages of twenty-three and thirty in 1933 and thirty-five and forty-two in 1945. They grew up 
during the First World War and the years of the Weimar Republic, but entered their professional 
lives under the National Socialist regime. The men of this group shared many of the same 
experiences, which makes them a rather uniform collection. They were all born to a middle-class 
background and grew up in well-to-do neighborhoods.36 The First World War, however, was 
their first common experience, which affected them collectively. They and their families greeted 
the war with “enthusiasm and a sense of determinism” in 1914.37 “While this generation did not 
                                                          
     36 Ingrao, Believe and Destroy, 4 
     37 Ibid., 3. 
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experience firsthand the physical violence and death and battle, the war was not a distant 
occurrence in their lives.”38 They and their families might have experienced war-euphoria in 
1914, but later on in life, they only recounted the harshness of those years.  
In his memoirs, published in 1956, Walter Schellenberg recounted his experience at war’s 
end: “We lived in Saarbrücken, and when I was only seven, I had my first experience of an air 
raid when the French bombed the town. The hard winter of that year, the hunger, the cold and the 
misery, will always remain in my memory. The French occupied the Saar after the defeat of 
1918, and our family business suffered.”39 Many lost fathers to the conflict at a young age. 
Werner Best was eleven when his father died in 1914.  
My father’s heroic death threw me back on myself when I 
was eleven. My mother collapsed and sought more support from 
her sons…As a result I was brought up by the family tradition 
rather than by the family itself…My father had left us a letter in 
which he commended our mother to us and exhorted us to become 
men, Germans and patriots…And from the age of fifteen, I felt 
responsible for the new direction Germany should take.40  
 
For Best, Schellenberg, and the rest of their generation, the war had left an indelible mark. They 
were not only traumatized by the realities of war, but also endured its defeat after being brought 
up in the image of German, masculine strength. Their fathers were the masculine ideal: serving 
the fatherland and dying heroically in combat. The idea that heroism and gallant death could be 
rendered worthless after defeat was a real source of psychological trauma. As powerless 
children, they saw their world crumble around them and they were determined to never allow 
themselves or Germany to fall into such a state again, a goal they “shared uncompromisingly.”41 
                                                          
     38 Wildt, An Uncompromising Generation, 21.  
     39 Walter Schellenberg,  The Schellenberg Memoirs, trans. Louis Hagen (London: A. Deutsch Publishing. 1956), 
19. 
     40 Ingrao, Believe and Destroy, 11. 
     41 Ibid., 4.  
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 As teenagers and young adults, they attended universities, joined völkisch, student 
organizations, and in some cases began to meet one another. They discovered others with similar 
backgrounds and beliefs. Erich Ehrlinger attended the University of Tübingen in 1928 and 
briefly left in 1930 to join the SA at the age of twenty.42 In 1931, Ehrlinger returned to Tübingen 
to finish his undergraduate studies in law, where he came in contact with another student activist, 
and future RSHA member, named Martin Sandberger, who was a member of the 
Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (National Socialist German Students League) 
or the NSDstB.43 Another acquaintanceship formed in Heidelberg between Werner Best and 
Franz Six. Best spent the immediate post-war years as an activist in the Rhineland, especially 
during its occupation in 1923 when he was arrested, but subsequently released, by French 
authorities.44 Best finished his undergraduate and doctoral studies in law at Heidelberg as a 
member of the Nationalsozialistischer Studentenbund (NSStB) by 1927. As a lecturer at the 
university, he came into contact with Franz Six, also studying at Heidelberg and a member of the 
NSStB.45  
The largest network of future RSHA men was in Leipzig, where Otto Ohlendorf, Emil 
Augsburg, Helmut Knochen, and at least eight others attended university between 1928 and 
1932.46 The most prominent, right-wing student group in Leipzig was the Black Hand, which 
was led by Heinz Gräfe, also a future member of the RSHA.47 These various student 
organizations often participated in rallies, conducted political and intellectual discussions on race 
and law, promoted National Socialist ideology, and worked to exclude Jews and other ‘outsiders’ 
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from university life. They provided opportunities for these young men to make intellectual and 
professional contacts with like-minded individuals. These organizations also provided a point of 
departure for membership in the SS, but it would be their post-undergraduate, intellectual 
pursuits that earned the attention of Heydrich and his newly formed SD.  
 What attracted the interest of Heydrich were clear demonstrations of intellectual status, 
zeal, and ambition, as well as a pre-existing belief in Nazi dogma that did not require 
indoctrination. Such was the case with Walter Schellenberg, who entered the SS in 1933 and did 
not require indoctrination, as his first job was to do the indoctrinating.48 Schellenberg received 
his bachelor’s degree in law from the University of Bonn for the explicit purpose of eventually 
“joining the foreign service,” but he first joined the SS and worked on its behalf as a lecturer, 
pontificating on the corruption of the Catholic Church and the need for German law to be 
founded in völkisch values.49 It was after one of his lectures in spring 1934 that he would be 
approached by two professors from the University of Bonn, who offered him a position, on 
behalf of Heydrich, in the SD. Schellenberg joined immediately and worked his way into the 
SD’s foreign office.50  
 Another individual who entered in this same fashion was Emil Augsburg. From the 
Leipzig network, Augsburg gained the attention of Heydrich’s recruiters for his knowledge of 
and interest in the Soviet press and intelligence service. Augsburg was born in 1904 in Łódź, 
then a part of the Russian empire, to a Volksdeutsch family and grew up speaking German, 
Polish, and Russian.51 His entry into the SD’s foreign office (and simultaneously the SS) in 1934 
was essentially assured because of his knowledge of Russian and Polish and his doctoral thesis 
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displayed his useful knowledge-base.52 While writing his doctoral thesis The State and Political 
Significance of the Soviet Press in its Historical Development, he spent ample time gaining 
intimate knowledge of the Soviet press and Soviet propaganda, which made his services 
indispensable for clear, ideological reasons.53  
Werner Best also entered the SS and SD in 1931 due to his intellectual pursuits. Having 
entered the SS and SD earlier than most among this sample group, Best garnered not only 
Heydrich’s interest, but also Himmler’s. His devout activism in the Rhineland along with his 
doctoral work brought not only another intellectual zealot into the fold, but also helped to seal 
the perception of the SS as an elite organization with connections to the best and brightest. Best’s 
thesis, albeit a solid academic treatise on labor and employment law in Weimar Germany, was 
appropriated by the SS to give it a positive association with academia.54 Best simultaneously 
entered the SD as Heydrich’s deputy and would play a critical role in establishing the ‘legal’ 
foundation for a secret, political police service, and administering the Gestapo after its 
absorption into the SD.55 Although committed to the völkisch principles of Nazi law, Best would 
later fall out of favor with both Himmler and Heydrich because of his insistence that the SS was 
not above the law of the state.56 Nonetheless, for Schellenberg, Augsburg, Best, and the rest of 
the new SS intelligentsia, the Nazi regime and particularly the SS offered opportunities to 
become the elite of new society; one that they would help to build through their service to Volk 
and Staat. As a cohort with a common source of trauma in the First World War, collective 
radicalization during their formative years at University or as rank and file Nazis, and shared 
beliefs and ambitions, they were to be the aspiring generation of the Third Reich.  
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Service to the State: Illusion and Reality 
The Illusion 
 Starting with their entrance to the SS, this intellectual elite was to give academic 
credence to the Nazi state and to become the brain trust of National Socialist ideology. Despite 
their positions within the SD, which were considered top secret, they still maintained 
connections, or even held, positions at universities, and published a number of treatises in 
academic or party-affiliated journals on various topics, such as economics, law, racial theory, 
and history.57 Some of it was legitimate academic work, such as Dr. Helmut Knochen’s 
biography on the eighteenth-century British playwright George Colman titled Der Dramatiker 
George Colman published in 1935, but was still appropriated by the Nazis for academic 
legitimacy. Other works, such as Franz Six’ Freimauerei und Judenemanzipation (Freemasonry 
and Jewish emancipation) published in 1938, were little more than racial propaganda with the 
trimmings of proper historical work.58 As Six’s work gave the Nazi regime and ideology the 
appearance of academic support, Six, along with others, received prestigious positions at 
universities. For instance, in 1938, at the age of twenty-seven, Six was granted a position not 
only as a full professor, but also as dean of History and Philosophy at Berlin University.59 
Werner Best’s academic prestige also suited Nazi intentions. Although after the start of 
the war, he published in 1940 a two-hundred fifty page book titled The Administration in Poland 
before and after the collapse of the Polish Republic, which, adding insult to injury, was a 
deliberate attempt to rewrite Polish history from a perspective of racial determinism after 
Poland’s swift defeat. The first two lines of this less-than-objective historiography states, “The 
national history of a people is always crucial in determining the state-building and state-
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maintaining abilities of its people, as well as determining in this history how many of these 
abilities are formed from outside influences. An overview of the state history of Poland compels 
one to form a negative verdict of the state-building and state-maintaining abilities of this 
nation.”60 Best clearly wanted to create a narrative supporting the new, European order, where 
the dominant German ruled over the weaker Slavs not just in the present moment, but throughout 
history.  
Although lacking the academic credentials of most of the men who worked for him, 
Heydrich also published work throughout the pre-war era. In 1936, he distributed a brochure 
through the party-affiliated publisher Franz Eher Nachfolger GmbH titled Wandlungen unseres 
Kampfes, which argued “that the struggle against [Jewish Bolshevism] has grown deeper than 
ever; a struggle that must no longer be fought with normal means… but by having its roots 
ripped from the ground.”61 In the same year, Heydrich also published an article titled Die 
Bekämpfung der Staatsfeinde in the prominent journal Deutsche Rechtswissenschaft (German 
Jurisprudence), which essentially argued the same point as the aforementioned article.62 Material 
published in a journal generally reserved for scholarly articles on law gave Nazi race theory the 
appearance of academic support, further symbolizing not only the subversion of law, but of 
academia as well. However, for the men of the RSHA, this was only a cover for their real work 
in the SS. 
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The Reality 
Prior to the start of the Second World War and the creation of the RSHA, the primary 
objectives of the men of the SD were to observe and report sources of opposition to the Nazi 
Reich. For example, during the winter of 1939, the SD-Inland issued a number of reports on the 
content and distribution of a book titled Die Grundlagen des jüdischen Volkes: eine notwendige 
Abrechung mit dem Judentum.63 Published in Breslau (Wrocław, Poland today)  by Pötsch 
Verlag in December 1938, Die Grundlagen was a last ditch effort by German author Walter 
Pötsch to express his outrage at the treatment of Jewish Germans and to rally support against the 
regime in response to the pogroms of Kristallnacht.64 He wrote,  
thousands have been bloodily beaten, brutally tortured, thrown in 
to concentrations camps, and mistreated; doctors, business-men, 
workers of all backgrounds, people like us! …German People! The 
voices of conscience, of humanity, of heart, of reason, and the 
voice of your fate are calling out to you!65  
 
His impassioned call to action unfortunately only attracted the attention of those who wished to 
silence him. A report by the SD-Inland in January, 1939 issued to the SiPo described the book as 
merely “dealing with the Jewish question in Germany and the reprisals against the Jews in a Jew-
favoring fashion” and recommended “protective custody” for Walter Pötsch as a necessary 
action.66 The fate of Walter Pötsch is unclear, but his attempt to appeal to the righteous 
indignation of the German people was quashed in swift and calculating fashion by the SD. All 
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copies of the book that could be located were confiscated and Pötsch Verlag was closed 
immediately.67 
 While the ‘Pötsch Case’ is an example of the SD’s role as an intelligence-gathering and 
decision-making entity, its members could also, when willing, take on roles that placed them in 
the front lines of fighting the enemies of the Reich. Dr. Franz Six, among others of the SD, was 
one with such a penchant for direct action. On January 25, 1938, Dr. Six vaguely reported back 
to SD headquarters in Berlin from the East Prussian city of Königsberg that the intelligence 
services of Danzig and Poland “have been damaged.”68 Eight days later, Erich Ehrlinger, a leader 
within SD-Inland Berlin at the time, forwards a report to the SD director of East Prussia, 
providing an overview of the event a week prior in Königsberg:  
During his stay in Königsberg, Dr. Six, working on behalf of the 
SD, took command of local security forces and led an ‘action’ 
against the ‘National Zionist Union,’ during which the intelligence 
services of Poland and Danzig were damaged…the ‘action’ 
occurred in response to the materials being sent across borders into 
Poland by the Zionists…the materials are being treated as evidence 
of the connection between the national Zionists and the [Polish] 
NZO (New Zionists’ Organization) and have been delivered to the 
necessary divisions…The operation is considered a success as the 
leader of the Zionists in Königsberg has been arrested, although it 
cannot be ascertained, how much damage this has caused the 
[Polish] intelligence service in Danzig.69  
 
The language of the order is intentionally vague, as is often the case with Nazi documents and 
details about the nature of the ‘action’ are lost, but what can be gleaned from this series of 
communications reveals more about those who wrote them than their actual topics. For one, 
despite Six’ comfy, tenured position at the University of Berlin and high rank in the SS and SD, 
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he was more than willing to engage in direct action against the enemies of the Reich; not just 
organize from an office in Berlin, but also lead cleansing operations in the streets.  
However, both this ‘action’ and the suppression of the Pötsch book were examples of 
early activities for the men of the SD that involved subverting possible sources of resistance and 
opposition within the German Reich. These operations largely targeted individuals and resulted 
in arrests and deportations to concentration camps, but during the invasion of the Soviet Union, 
the RSHA targeted broad swaths of populations for extermination based on Nazi conceptions of 
racial inferiority. A radical shift in policy was made possible through a world war and an 
adaptive administration. Only a few months after the suppression of the Pötsch Verlag, the 
Second World War commenced with the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, and the SD 
would be combined with the SiPo to form the more efficient, flexible, and murderous Reich 
Main Security Office. 
The Creation of the RSHA 
In 1937, Heinrich Himmler described the purpose of the SD and SiPo as destined “to 
protect the German people as a total organic being, its life force, and its institutions, from 
destruction and decay.”70 Additionally, when Reinhard Heydrich expressed the wish to forge a 
new SS and police organization out of the SD and the SiPo and gave the task of designing it to 
Walter Schllenberg and Werner Best, his key phrase to guide them was “a fighting 
administration.”71 Heydrich imagined that,  
the RSHA was supposed to unite political initiative, analysis of 
issues, organizational responsibilities, and practical 
implementation into a single institution that would be regulated by 
no administrative or legal norms but instead would be capable of 
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acting as a political organization everywhere and with any means 
deemed politically necessary.72  
 
This radical transformation of the SD and SiPo from compartmentalized organizations into an 
all-encompassing bureaucracy large enough to administer all Nazi-occupied lands at the height 
of the Second World War, yet nimble enough to adapt to specific and changing tasks, radicalized 
the men of the RSHA from racial theorists and Nazi intellectuals to calculating executioners. A 
transformation their experiences made possible.  
 However, a detailed history of the RSHA, even for its brief, five-year existence, is an 
exhaustive study in bureaucratic jargon, groups and subgroups appearing then disappearing, and 
individuals shifting between offices,  from the office to the field, and vise-versa. What can be 
gleaned from this minutia-riddled assemblage, however, is that the RSHA was not overblown 
and inefficient, but nimble, dynamic, and able to adapt. “It was capable of expanding or 
shrinking, building new departments and dissolving old ones, shifting priorities or establishing 
new ones, and initiating intra-agency task forces.”73 For example, when the RSHA was first 
organized on Septermber 27, 1939, it contained six offices, but Franz Six organized a seventh 
office titled “Ideological Research and Evaluation,” which would become a crucial office for 
two, specific war aims: the physical and racial assault on Europe.74  
Six, however, was often detached to “Office II Organization, Administration, Law” or 
attached to a command of a Einsatzkommando throughout the war. Office VII, with and without 
Six, however, played a major role in the intellectual theft of Europe by the Nazis. Office VII was 
often known as the “Library of the RSHA” and during the war it amassed a voluminous 
collection of books, treatises, and other academic works by Jewish intellectuals in order “to build 
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a case for a Jewish conspiracy against the state and legitimize the expulsion and extermination of 
the Jews.”75 A pre-requisite to be a member of this office was to at least have an undergraduate 
degree and six of the twelve of the section heads had earned their PhDs.76 The sources for their 
‘research’ were all looted from private and public libraries, synagogues, and Yeshivas across 
Europe.77 Following the invasion of Poland, after being transported in six train cars, 500,000 
volumes arrived at the new Library, but this number increased, by some estimates, to three-
million by the end of 1941, with the addition of Marxist and Freemason literature.78 
 Another critical office of the RSHA was “Office III German-life-areas,” or the former 
SD-Inland office. Otto Ohlendorf and Emil Augsburg were both assigned to it, with the former 
as Office head and the latter as a group leader, who also worked extensively with “Office VI 
Foreign Affairs.” Both were later sent east in 1941 as Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommando 
leaders.79 Interestingly, the German word for the title of Office III was Lebensgebiet, which one 
could directly define as ‘life domain,’ but the definition this carried in the RSHA was much more 
encompassing, even revolutionary. Testifying at Nuremberg after the war, Ohlendorf tried to 
define the term for the tribunal: 
It’s very difficult to define, as it includes a whole world of ideas. 
Let’s take the ‘domain of law, for example. We need to imagine 
that the life of the law includes all its institutions and their effects 
on the normal course of life. In our groups, we have always 
expressed the opinion that culture was wider than what is usually 
understood by this term, in other words that it includes all the 
manifestations of the life of a people. This means culture in the 
narrow sense, just like areas that are distant from it, such as 
economics, which are then included. This must not just include the 
superficial, but the whole human environment that springs from it. 
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Thus for us, public health, law administration, economics, the 
sciences, education, and religious life all composed the ‘life 
domain.’80 
 
From this definition, one can get a sense that Office III was the very organization Himmler 
explained in the quote from 1937. It was this turgidly named office that, during the war years and 
afterwards, given a Nazi victory, would control and monitor every aspect of the Volk: 
Gleichschaltung brought to its full potential. During the war, the Office was especially useful for 
gauging actual public opinion of the war effort, but this function ceased after 1943 for fear of the 
demoralizing effect of the collected data.81 The formation of this Office was the pet-project of 
Ohlendorf, who only put off further development in order to command Einsatzgruppe D and 
‘cleanse’ the continent of the biological enemies of the Volk: a pre-requisite, in his estimation, 
for the flourishing of the Volk as masters of Europe.82 
 The largest office of the RSHA and the one that employed three of the individuals 
focused on in this study was “Office VI Foreign Affairs,” which contained forty-three sub-
sections at its height due to, as one may imagine, the vast amount of land under Nazi occupation 
and the fact Germany was eventually at war with three, major allied powers.83 The three who 
worked in Office VI, for the most part, were Walter Schellenberg, Emil Augsburg, and Dr. 
Helmut Knochen. When Office VI was established, it was intended to form the groundwork for  
administering the occupied territories and conducting counter-espionage, which often put it into 
close cooperation with “Office IV Investigating and Combating Opponents” (The Gestapo 
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Office).84 It was in Office IV, specifically Group IV E specializing in counter-espionage, where 
Walter Schellenberg started his work with the RSHA.85  
According to Schellenberg’s recollection, it was on June 22, 1941, the day of the invasion 
of the Soviet Union, that he was appointed head of Office VI for the sole purpose of turning the 
office into “a more unified intelligence service” and using his connections with the Gestapo to 
foster closer cooperation between these two offices.86 Evidence of close cooperation between 
these offices, although dated to 1939, before Schellenberg became chief of Office VI, comes in 
the form of a series of internal, RSHA memoranda between Dr. Helmut Knochen, the second 
individual of Office VI, and Adolf Eichmann of “Office IV Group B4: Emigration and 
Evacuation” a sub-group that specialized in orchestrating the mass deportations of Jews and 
other ‘enemies of the state.’ In one communication, Dr. Knochen provides a recommendation for 
an individual named Paul Schmitz to work in Eichmann’s office in a “position specializing in 
transport capacity.”87 Eichmann, considered to be one of architects of the Holocaust, apparently 
required specialized assistance and Office VI offered support where needed. 
 The third individual of this study in Office VI was Emil Augsburg, who was assigned 
early in the history of the RSHA to “Group C Eastern European Affairs.” Augsburg, because of 
his specialties, would see little time behind a desk in Berlin and much more in the killing fields 
of eastern Europe. He and many other officials of the RSHA were making this transition from 
intellectual to Schreibtischtäter or Täter. The RSHA was radical in that it created an apparatus 
where intelligent, although clearly anti-Semitic, individuals, who would have otherwise pursued 
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solely careers in academia or civil service, became perpetrators both indirectly of mass murder 
and directly. The Einsatzgruppen, the creations of the RSHA, provided the opportunity for 
legalized, and in their view, justified violence and genocide. The operations of the 
Einsatzgruppen, most of whose leaders were members of the RSHA, “were far more horrible 
than the acts of terror that had been committed by the same men in their earlier positions as 
Gestapo and SD leaders.”88  
The Einsatzgruppen 
The first experiences at genocide for the men of the RSHAcame during the invasion of 
Poland, as this proved to be the testing ground for policies later in the war.89 In the weeks 
leading up to the invasion, Heydrich and a number of his top SD officials, which included 
Werner Best, Franz Six, Erich Ehrlinger, and Helmut Knochen, organized, outfitted, and 
assembled five Einsatzgruppen in the cities of Allenstein, Breslau, Dramburg-Pommern, Oppeln, 
and Vienna, which served as their launching points into Poland.90 “The members of the 
Einsatzgruppen were drawn primarily from the SS and police stations of the areas surrounding 
the respective assembly points,” but the leaders of the larger Einsatzgruppen and the smaller, 
more nimble Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos were chosen from among the leadership 
in the SiPo, SD, and among Heydrich’s group as well. Ehrlinger, for example, joined the staff of 
Einsatzgruppe IV.91  
The objective of the Einsatzgruppen in Poland was rearguard work: clearing potential 
‘combatants’ in Polish cities and towns behind the advance of the Wehrmacht. However, who the 
Einsatzgruppen and Kommandos determined to be combatants was left to their discretion. In a 
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consolidated field report from Einsatzgruppen III and IV on September 6, 1939, the two units 
were sweeping the towns of Kempen and Konitz, respectively, and encountered sporadic 
resistance from “armed militia.”92 This was used as a pretense to broaden their definitions of 
combatants and act accordingly. In Kempen, one-hundred “criminals” and fifty Jews were taken 
into “protective custody.”93 The report does not suggest that they were executed, at least not 
immediately, but during the six-week operation of the Einsatzgruppen in Poland, 10,000 people 
were executed. This, however, pales in comparison to the slaughter that occurred during the 
invasion of the Soviet Union in June, 1941, when the men of the RSHA were not just organizers, 
but active participants of mass-murder.94 
 From June 22 to the end of December, 1941, the four Einsatzgruppen collectively killed 
approximately 550,000 people at a rate of execution fifty-five times higher than that in Poland 
and the men of the RSHA were some of the most fanatical in the bloodshed.95 However, unlike 
in Poland where there was daily correspondence between Berlin and the Einsatzgruppen, orders 
from the RSHA were less frequent and were often broad and discretionary, leaving the 
organization of Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos and how the executions were to be 
performed in the field up to individual commanders.96 Otto Ohlendorf, commander of 
Einsatzgruppe D, which was assigned to the Ukraine, stacked his command with not just RSHA 
men, but personnel from his own office, which made his command much more personally 
attuned.97 In a six-day period, from August 23 to August 29, 1941, Ohlendorf’s command, which 
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included Romanian auxiliary troops, executed approximately 4,300 Jews in the region 
surrounding Ananyev in the Ukraine.98  
 Operating in the Ukraine later in the war was Erich Ehrlinger, who, while stationed in 
Kiev as commander of SD forces, demonstrated his efficient method of murder in numerous 
cases. Ehrlinger, unlike Ohlendorf, was often present at execution pits and was known to 
encourage his command with motivational speeches before executions. He even personally shot 
men, women, and children to set an example of killing without remorse or zeal.99 Before his 
appointment in Kiev, Ehrlinger’s efficiency caught the attention of his superiors when he was 
commander of Einsatzkommando 1b in Latvia during the summer of 1941. From July 7 to July 
16, Ehrlinger and his seventy-man command “executed 1,150 Jews” near the town of Daugavpils 
and encouraged all in his command to “equally participate.”100  
However, in one infamous instance in the summer of 1943 near the small town of 
Michalowa just outside of Kiev, Ehrlinger broke from his usual detached and efficient methods. 
After a successful escape of five Jewish prisoners from his custody, Ehrlinger ordered the entire, 
local Jewish population of the ghetto to assemble in the square where he asked them all to start to 
count off. The approximate five-hundred Jews did not immediately follow his orders and began 
to murmur amongst themselves in a perceived show of defiance. In response, Ehrlinger, 
reportedly angry and screaming incoherently, drew his pistol and discharged two, full magazines 
of ammunition into the crowd at random and without discretion, killing and wounding many.101 
The former Tübingen University graduate of law was now killing not because of ideology or 
orders, but for the sake of killing. His zeal for slaughter made his superiors reluctant to relocate 
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him. Ehrlinger did not leave his position until he was promoted to the head of Office III of the 
RSHA in 1944, making him the longest serving ‘field specialist’ of the RSHA.102 
 For Ehrlinger, the transformation had reached its radical conclusion, but others, perhaps 
more horrifyingly, maintained their calculating composure during the long months of massacre. 
During what many hoped to be the final push towards Moscow in the fall of 1941, Dr. Franz Six 
left his positions at the RSHA and at Berlin University to take part in intelligence work in 
Smolensk. Six, in cooperation with other SD officers, “captured and identified key, political 
commissars for interrogation, torture, and execution.”103 Six was slated to lead the first 
Einsatzkommando into Moscow as soon as the city fell in order to seize the prized documents of 
the Kremlin.104 Also a part of this taskforce was Emil Augsburg, but, unlike Six, he had more 
extensive experience on the Eastern Front with Soviet prisoners. Since June, 1941, Augsburg had 
been in command of Einsatzkommando Moskau, which specialized in swiftly interrogating and 
executing dozens of Soviet officers throughout the summer and was slated to be the first task 
force to enter the Soviet capital.105 During a Soviet air attack in Smolensk, Augsburg was 
wounded and sent back to Berlin, where he, due to his ideologically sensitive work in the east, 
continued his work with the RSHA until the end of the war.106  
To the Bitter End 
Despite the academic and ideological ardor of Augsburg, Ehrlinger, Ohlendorf, Six, and 
the rest of the RSHA leadership, Moscow did not fall. Rather, Nazi-occupied Europe fell after a 
string of military defeats, and the new, European order that they devoted their lives and careers 
                                                          
      102 Ibid., 301. 
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to creating crumbled before their eyes. But even for these academics, denial of the situation was 
a powerful anesthesia. They continued their work researching, publishing, and killing for the 
Nazi Reich to the bitter end.  The evidence for such fanatical denial lies in the publications and 
speeches of these individuals during the war years, with Dr. Franz Six being the most vocal of 
the SS intelligentsia. In January 1944, despite the already deteriorated military situation, Six 
published an article titled “The Transformation of the European State System to the World State 
System” in the journal Zeitschrift für Politik that focused on the Nazis’ view for Europe’s future 
as a united continent leading the world. He argued that “Germany, in this current conflict, is 
fighting for the western-European cultural community, for the ascension, through a common, 
European Lebensraum, of the new European order to the position of a world-power…and against 
the Anglo-Saxon powers, who would willingly place ideological world-hegemony in the hands 
of their bolshevist partner.”107 Six, like the rest of the SS intelligentsia, believed in the bright 
future of their new world order and wanted to promote its ascendancy, no matter the reality. A 
year later in March of 1945, when Nazi Germany’s destruction was imminent, Six published one 
last article titled Europe in Question: The Crisis of the European Spirit, but with more of an 
urgent and apocalyptic tone. He still brazenly urged all of Europe to resist occupation and to “not 
let what took centuries to create be destroyed in mere months, weeks, days, or even hours; to 
consider the results of the First World War as just a small example of the substantial loses, both 
physical spiritual, and intellectual, in store for Europe.”108  
Even before the destructive year of 1945, The RSHA had already abandoned its central 
office, due to the constant, allied bombing campaigns, and distributed its various sub-sections 
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throughout Germany, which decreased effective communication and cooperation, and created, in 
certain areas, bureaucratic fiefdoms.109 With the perceived, mortal enemy of National-Socialism, 
Jewish-Bolshevism, on Germany’s doorstep, an atmosphere of simultaneous anxiety and 
contempt for the enemy, one that had been fostered since the start of the war, reached a fever 
pitch, which pushed them further to the conviction of fighting to the bitter end.110 For example, 
in the last months of the war, the Swiss and Swedish red-cross attempted to negotiate with the SS 
for the release of prisoners from concentration camps to receive proper aid.111  Only in the last 
weeks of April, 1945, did Sweden secure the release of Scandinavian prisoners, but Switzerland 
still received a cold rejection, further proof of the stubbornness and callousness  exhibited by 
many of these men, even at war’s end.112 The RSHA, with its original central office in Berlin 
being reduced to rubble by February 1945, finally ceased to exist on April, 23 1945, when its 
leaders finally realized the end had come and went into hiding.113 
Conclusion 
On December 17, 1941, while giving a speech in Prague on the need for closer 
cooperation between Germany and southeastern Europe in the “struggle against international, 
Jewish bolshevism,” Reinhard Heydrich ended his speech with the pledge, “to the prosperity of a 
greater Germany and to the prosperity of a new Europe.”114 Four years later, with Europe in 
shambles, tens of millions killed, wounded, or displaced, the irony of such a statement could 
have not been stronger. The former leaders and intelligentsia of the SS were no longer the 
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founders of a new world order, but war criminals in a defeated and occupied Germany. The SS 
and its nexus of organized and intellectual terror, the RSHA, were to have brought the Nazi 
racial state and its vision of Europe into existence, but failed. It is sometimes assumed that Nazi 
war criminals were nothing more than the dregs of society, typical ‘Brown-Shirt’ thugs, who 
manipulated their way to the top and came from criminal backgrounds. Yet, for the large part, 
this was not the case.  
As Michael Wildt noted, “this  project [the RSHA] led  droves  of  intellectuals,  
academics  and  scientists  to  become  ready  supporters  of  the  Nazi  regime.  At  last,  
philosophers  could  believe  that  they  were  in power;  physicians  could  see  themselves  in  
the  role  of  uncontrolled  designers  of human  life;  historians  could  think  themselves  in  a  
position  to  shape  world history.”115 They were not just racial, anti-Semitic theorists, sitting in 
the proverbial ivory tower, dreaming and ranting among their fellow cohorts about the necessity 
of a homogenous and strong Volk. They joined, organized, and commanded the organizations 
that made theory and ideology a reality. Along with their educated and middle class upbringing, 
their experiences as a generation prepared them for radicalization. Their experiences as children 
of the First World War, as völkisch activists in their youth, and as young, Nazi intellectuals, 
making connections at universities and other academic settings, helped solidify their theories and 
made them into true believers. Yet, it was the nature of the RSHA as a radicalizing and all-
encompassing entity that created opportunities to not only focus their energies, but to commit 
acts they otherwise would never have thought themselves capable of perpetrating. 
Epilogue: Did They Escape Justice? 
Of the eight individuals used in this study to give a glimpse into this ‘RSHA Generation,’ 
seven survived the war.  All seven went into hiding, but could not remain out of sight for long. 
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250,000 former Nazis were detained by the occupational forces, but the overwhelming majority 
of this group received light sentences, considering the nature of their crimes, or nothing at all, 
with only the top, few leaders in the regime receiving the harshest of sentences. With only a few 
exceptions, such as Otto Ohlendorf, most of the men of the RSHA generation re-entered German 
society with little to no hindrance.116 Some became business-men, advertising executives, or 
worked for the booming automobile industry. Franz Six was released in 1951 after only serving 
five years in prison and worked as an advertising executive for Porsche until his death in 1975. 
But where does this leave the question of guilt for the men of this generation? Did they largely 
escape justice? If so, what does this say about Germany after the Holocaust? Shortly after the 
end of the National Socialist regime, the memory of the RSHA was both figuratively and literally 
buried under cold war divisions. The Berlin Wall was built over the remains of the RSHA in the 
center of Berlin and divided Germany, both east and west, sought to suppress the crimes of their 
nation or conveniently place all the blame on a few dead men such as Hitler, Himmler, and 
Goebbels. The crimes of the Third Reich are bigger than any one person or any handful of 
perpetrators; they were crimes only an entire nation is capable of committing. Ehrlinger should 
have been executed or sentenced to life in prison for the 1,150 lives he and his command had 
executed in Latvia. Perhaps all 250,000 detained Nazis should have been removed from German 
society through imprisonment, expulsion, or execution, but Germany’s guilt would have 
remained nonetheless. The Nazi regime did not come to power through a coup led by a radical 
minority, but was chosen by the German people. 
In the 1960s, the first generation of post-war, West Germans confronted this history by 
asking the older generation, “What did you do during the war?” A few high ranking Nazis were 
put on trial, but most were simply identified and never prosecuted, much like the men of the 
                                                          
     116 For the fates of these men after 1945, see Appendix 1A. 
36 
 
RSHA. This process of identifying and making publically known how many former Nazis were 
still a part of West German society was a first and difficult step in coming to terms with the 
nation’s past. Following reunification with East Germany and the fall of the Berlin wall, the 
process of coming to terms with the past gained momentum in the unified state as citizens 
revisited questions of national identity. Open dialogues on national guilt, German identity, and 
the building of memorials in Berlin symbolized progress made. As Germany peeled back the 
layers of its historical conscience, researchers rediscovered the physical remains of the RSHA 
beneath the Cold-War layer of Berlin’s history. The foundation blocks of the RSHA are currently 
on display as a part of the free exhibit Die Topographie des Terrors, displaying not only the 
structural architecture of a totalitarian state, but also the names and faces of its architects. 
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Appendix 1A: Glossary of Personnel117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
117 The information in this glossary was compiled from multiple sources on the RSHA 
Reinhard Heydrich: Born on March 7, 1904 in Halle, Germany. 
- Came from a middle class family; Father ran the local, music conservatory and raised his 
children to be musicians. Heydrich excelled at piano and violin. 
- Joined a Freikorps in March 1919 at the age of 15, and a civil defense formation the 
following year. 
- Entered the German Navy in 1922 to pursue a career as an officer. 
- Joined Himmler’s fledging SS in 1931 as his deputy and head of the SD 
- Made Chief of the SD and SiPo on June 26, 1936 
- Chief of the RSHA on September 27, 1939 
- Died on June 4, 1942 following and assassination attempt in Prague. 
Emil Augsburg: Born in Łódź in 1904 to a middle class, Volksdeutsch family 
- Raised to speak German, Polish, and Russia 
- Attended the University of Leipzig to study law and worked as an editor for its publishing 
house. 
- Earned his PhD in 1934, which focused on the Soviet Press, and entered the SD-Ausland the 
same year. 
- Entered the RSHA as part of Office VII Research division (the library). 
- Given command of Sonderkommando Moskau : specialized in the liquidation of Soviet 
Officers 
- Worked for the American OSS and CIC (Counter-Intelligence Committee) from 1946-1948 
as a specialist on Soviet intelligence; never put on trial. 
- Believed to have died in 1981 
Werner Best: Born July 10, 1903 in Darmstadt, Germany to a middle class family 
-  Arrested during the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 for subversive activity, but was 
later released. 
- Attended Heidelberg University for both Undergraduate and Doctoral studies in law: He 
wrote his thesis in 1927 on European Tariff law. 
- Joined the SS and SD in 1931 as  Heydrich’s Deputy 
- As Chief of SD forces in Denmark in 1942, he tried to implement the final solution with 
little result due to the resistance of the Danish People. 
- Werner Best was never tried in Germany, but did testify on behalf of Six and Ohlendorf 
during the Nuremburg trials. Best always asserted his role as ‘legal advisor’ and that he 
never knew of the mass killings, but thought the Jews were being expelled eastward. 
Investigations by West German Authorities in the sixties suggested that he had a much larger 
role as an organizer, who provided völkisch legal justification for mass murder, but Best was 
considered to be in too poor of health to stand trial, and lived in Germany until 1989. 
 
Erich Ehrlinger: Born October 10, 1910 in Baden-Württemberg to a middle class family 
- Entered the University of Tübigen in 1928 to study law, but briefly left to join the SA in 
1930. Returned to finish his studies in 1932.  
- Left his career in law to join the SS in 1935 and was selected for service in the SD. 
- Gained experience as a Sonderkommando leader in the Sudentenland and Austria. 
- Given command of Sonderkommando 1b and is held responsible for 1,150 executions in 
Latvia, and hundreds more in the Ukraine. 
- Promoted to head of Office III of the RSHA in 1944. 
- He went into hiding under an assumed name after the war, but was denounced by his ex-wife 
in 1952. Not arrested until 1958, he was sentenced in 1961 to twelve years in prison for 
1,045 counts of being an ‘accomplice to murder,’ but only served four. He died in 2004 in 
Karlsruhe, Germany.  
Source: Public Domain 
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Helmut Knochen: Born on March 14, 1910 in Magdeburg, Germany to a middle class family 
- Studied German, English, and Physical Education at Leipzig from 1930-34.  
- Joined the Nazi party in 1932 and completed his dissertation in 1935 at Göttingen University 
on the English dramatist, George Coleman. Brought into the SS and SD by Franz Six in 1936. 
- Appointed chief of SD and SiPo forces in Paris in June, 1940. He was responsible for the 
implementation of the final solution in Paris and then all of occupied France in 1942 (was a 
part of Office VI SD-Ausland of the RSHA) 
- In 1946, Knochen was sentenced to death for ordering the execution of a British paratrooper, 
but was then extradited to France where he was also sentenced to death in 1954. His sentence 
was commuted to life-imprisonment in 1958, but given amnesty in 1962, where he returned 
to Germany and worked as an insurance salesman. 
- He died in 2003. 
Otto Ohlendorf:Born February 7, 1907in Söhlde, Germany to a middle class family 
- Joined the Nazi Party in 1925 and the SS in 1926, before even Himmler. 
- Studied economics at the University of Leipzig from 1928 to 1932. 
- Earned his Doctorate in law in 1936; the same year he joined the SD. 
- Head of Office III SD-Inland at the RSHA’s inception 
- Appointed head of Einsatzgruppen D in the Ukraine for much of the war. 
- Ohlendorf was tried at Nuremburg and he, like most of the defendants, tried to argue for his 
innocence, based on that the fact that he was only following orders. The tribunal did not find 
it convincing and found him responsible for the deaths of 90,000. 
- Ohlendorf was executed by Hanging on June 8, 1951: the only one to be executed of this 
group.  
Walter Schellenberg: Born January 16, 1910 in Saarbrücken, Germany to a middle class family 
- Studied Law at the University of Bonn; joined the SS in 1933 and was recruited for the SD in 
1934. 
- Became a specialist in counter-espionage in the SD-Ausland and was made chief of Office VI 
SD-Ausland of the RSHA on June 22, 1941. 
- Fancying himself a ‘James Bond,’ type of spy, Schellenberg travelled across Europe and 
Africa, taking part in numerous espionage-related projects.  
- Although recognized by a military tribunal as being fully aware and even contributing to the 
mistreatment and mass murder of Soviet POWs, he was only sentenced to six years in prison 
and served only two, after being released early for poor health. 
- He died of Liver cancer in 1952 after completing his memoirs in Italy. 
Franz Six: Born August 12, 1909 in Mannheim, Germany to a middle class family. 
- Studied philosophy and history at the University of Heidelberg from 1929 to 1934, 
completing both his undergraduate and doctoral studies. 
- Joined the Nazi Party in 1930 and the SA in 1932. 
- He was a member of the NSStB during his studies in Heidelberg, where he met Werner Best, 
who was influential in his recruitment to the SS and SD in 1935. 
- He was Professor of History at Berlin University, chief of Office VII Ideological Research, 
and later of Office II Administration and Law at the RSHA during the War years. 
- Involved in various SD operations before and during the War, Six only received a twenty-
year sentence due to a lack of evidence directly linking him to the killings; evidence that 
would resurface later in the form of testimonies from other perpetrators in his unit. His 
sentence was twenty-years in prison, but was released in 1951 after only serving five years, 
and worked the rest of his life as an advertising executive for Porche until his death in 1975. 
Source: Public Domain 
Source: Public Domain 
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Appendix 1B: Glossary of Terms 
 
SS: Schutzstaffel (Protection Squad) - An elite corps of the Nazi Regime led by Heinrich 
Himmler after 1929. 
 
SA: Sturmabteilung (Assault division)  - An essential private army of the Nazis used heavily in 
street battles during their rise to power and led by Ernst Röhm; subsumed into the SS after the 
Night of the Long Knives and the assassination of Ernst Röhm.  
 
SD: Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service) - Formed in 1931 by Reinhard Heydrich at the behest of 
Himmler to form an elite, intelligence gathering service.  
 
SiPo: Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police) - Formed in 1936 by Himmler and placed under the 
leadership of Heydrich, it contained the infamous Gestapo (Secret Police) and the KriPo 
(Criminal Police).  
 
RSHA: Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Main Security Office) - Created on September 27, 
1939, it was an amalgamation of the offices of the SD and SiPo, as well as creating few new 
offices as well. It was vital for the close coordination, cooperation, and necessary planning for 
units, such as the Einsatzgruppen, and the implementation of the Final Solution later in the war.  
 
Ausland: Abroad or foreign 
 
Einsatzgruppe (Task force): An invention of the RSHA and whose members were recruited from 
the SiPo and SD, these units were integral to carrying out operations of high ideological 
importance, especially on the eastern front, such as the execution of ideological enemies (Jews, 
Soviet Officers, Partisans, etc.) and securing vital documents from foreign archives. There were 
four during the Invasion of the Soviet Union: Einsatzgruppe A, B, C, and D.  
 
Einsatzkommando and Sonderkommando (Operations unit and special unit): Both were 
subdivisions within a larger Einsatzgruppe and are essentially interchangeable. They refer to the 
same size task forces, which perform the same tasks. It was up to commander’s discretion as to 
which term was used. 
 
Freikorps: Paramilitary groups formed in Germany during the chaotic months after the End of 
the First World War to suppress communist forces. Although supporting the creation of the 
Weimar Republic, they were often politically aligned to the far-right.  
 
Gauleiter: Regional leaders of the Nazi party in Germany 
 
Gleichschaltung (Coordination): Nazi policy of ‘coordinating’ all aspects of German Society 
with Nazi ideology; it was successful to varying degrees.  
 
Inland: Interior or domestic. 
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Kristallnacht (Night of Broken Glass): A nation-wide Pogrom against its Jewish citizens, 
organized by the Nazi Regime that occurred November 7-9, 1938. 
 
Machtergreifung (Seizure of Power): Term used to refer to the Nazi seizure of Power on January 
30, 1933. 
 
Mitläufer (fellow travelers): Term used to refer to those in Nazi Germany who went along with 
Nazi policies and made no effort to resist. 
 
NSDstB: Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (National Socialist German Students 
League) - A nation-wide, Nazi Student organization founded in 1926.  
 
NSStB: Nationalsozialistischer Studentenbund (National Socialist Students League) – A Nazi 
Student organization specific to Heidelberg University; also founded in 1926. 
 
Schreibtischtäter: Literally, ‘desk criminal.’ 
 
Staat: State 
 
Stabswache: Headquarters‘ guard 
 
Stosstrupp: Strike force.  
 
Täter: Perpetrator, culprit, or criminal 
 
Volk (A people or nation): Within the context of this study, the term refers to the Nazi ideal of a 
racially, ideological ‘healthy,’ German nation. 
 
völkisch (ethnic/ national): An adjective describing ideas or actions that fit within Nazi 
conceptions of the German ethnicity or nation.  
 
Volksdeutsch (Ethnic German): Refers to ethnic Germans living outside of German speaking 
lands. 
 
Wannsee Institute: An organization founded in 1937 in Wannsee, a suburb of Berlin that 
specialized in surveillance, research, and analysis of the Soviet Unioin. 
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